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TYRANNY  BY  PROXY:  STATE  ACTION  AND  THE
PRIVATE  USE  OF  DEADLY FORCE
John L. Watts*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade there has been considerable public debate over
the wisdom of the so-called “stand your ground” laws that allow for the use of
deadly force in self-defense, even if the actor could safely retreat and avoid
the threatening aggressor.1  Supporters of the law maintain that law-abiding
citizens should not have to cower from those threatening serious bodily
harm.  Rather they should be allowed to confront the threat with deadly
force.2  Opponents maintain that these laws leads to vigilante justice3 and the
needless escalation of disputes that could have been avoided had one party
simply walked away.4  While Florida’s statute has garnered particular national
© 2014 John L. Watts.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, cum
laude, 1996; B.A., University of Maryland, summa cum laude, 1992.  The author would like to
recognize his research assistant, Lauren McDivitt, for her patience and diligent assistance.
1 Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 535–36 (2010) (exploring the various iterations of the castle doc-
trine); Zachary L. Weaver, Note, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the
Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 400–03 (2008) (criticizing certain aspects of
Florida’s castle doctrine and making recommendations for amendments).
2 Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 237, 243–44 (2008) (discussing the influence of the American ideal of the “true
man” on the abandonment of the English duty to retreat in favor of the right to stand your
ground in nineteenth-century America); see also Levin, supra note 1, at 524; Weaver, supra R
note 1, at 396. R
3 P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-
Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1,
36 (2007) (suggesting that the stand your ground statutes create a vigilante atmosphere);
Michelle Jaffe, Note, Up in Arms over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30 NOVA L. REV.
155, 178 (2005) (citing Armed and Dangerous: NRA-Backed Gun Bill Deadly for Florida, DAY-
TONA BEACH NEWS-J., Mar. 14, 2005, at 04A).
4 Weaver, supra note 1, at 402–03. But see Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: R
Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 543–44
(2007) (disputing claims that Florida’s stand your ground law encourages violence).
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attention,5 stand your ground laws are neither new nor unique.6  Currently,
twenty-four states allow private citizens to use deadly force in self-defense
without imposing a duty to retreat.7  Furthermore, all states permit the police
to use deadly force in self-defense without imposing a duty to retreat.8
Despite the widespread focus on stand your ground laws, the continued
existence of the common law fleeing felon rule has gone almost unnoticed.
Several states permit private persons to use deadly force to protect property
or prevent the escape of a fleeing felon even when the felon does not impose
a threat of death or serious bodily harm.  Under the common law fleeing
felon rule, both law enforcement officers and private citizens enjoyed the
privilege of using deadly force to secure the arrest of felons, but neither
could use the privilege to secure the arrest of misdemeanants.9  Although the
fleeing felon rule was once the prevailing view in most American jurisdic-
tions, in Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court held that a police officer’s
use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspected burglar violates the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.10  A police
officer may constitutionally use deadly force only if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a danger of serious physical harm to
the officer or others.11  Despite the Court’s decision in Garner, some states
continue to allow private citizens to use deadly force to protect property or
prevent the escape of nonviolent fleeing felons.12  In these states, a private
5 Jaffe, supra note 3, at 178; Weaver, supra note 1, at 395–97. R
6 Suk, supra note 2, at 243–44 (discussing the late nineteenth-century abandonment, R
by the majority of states, of the English duty to retreat in public places).
7 Weaver, supra note 1, at 397 (stating that 23 states have passed stand your ground R
laws similar to Florida’s and naming most of them); Cora Currier, The 24 States That Have
Sweeping Self-Defense Laws Just Like Forida’s, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://
www.propublica.org/article/the-23-states-that-have-sweeping-self-defense-laws-just-like-
floridas (listing Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and West Virginia as states with statutory stand your ground laws).
8 Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685, 703 n.107
(2001) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 461 (2d ed. 1986)).
9 Steven C. Day, Shooting the Fleeing Felon: State of the Law, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 285,
286–87 (1978) (citing cases and 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 119 (1788)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (discussing the
common law fleeing felon rule as to police officers).
10 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.
11 Id.
12 Since the Court’s decision in Garner, state court decisions in Michigan and South
Carolina have expressly authorized private persons to use deadly force to stop nonviolent
fleeing felons. See, e.g., People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Mich. 1990) (holding that
Garner did not modify the common law fleeing felon privilege of a private person to use
deadly force); State v. Cooney, 463 S.E.2d 597, 599 (S.C. 1995) (“[W]e find the holding in
Garner does not apply to seizures by private persons and does not change the State’s crimi-
nal law with respect to citizens using force in apprehending a fleeing felon.”).  Texas, by
statute, authorizes the private use of deadly force, when necessary, to prevent the escape of
many felons, including one suspected of committing theft during the nighttime when
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person may shoot and kill a common thief to prevent his escape even though
a police officer is constitutionally prohibited from using deadly force under
the same circumstances.
The common law fleeing felon rule, as it applies to private persons, is
arguably constitutionally permissible because of the state action doctrine.13
The state action doctrine and its exceptions are among the most fundamen-
tal, important, and misunderstood principles of constitutional law.14  Under
the state action doctrine, most of the Constitution’s protections of individual
liberties restrict the conduct of government actors, but they do not restrict
the conduct of private actors.15  There are, however, two exceptions to the
state action doctrine that, when they apply, provide constitutional protec-
tions from infringements by private persons to the same extent as govern-
ment actors.  The entanglement exception applies when the state commands,
encourages, or facilitates private action that the government is constitution-
ally prohibited from doing itself.16  The second exception, the public func-
escaping with the private person’s property. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.42 (West 2011).  A
Missouri statute authorizes the private use of deadly force when “necessary to effect the
arrest of a person who at that time and in his presence committed or attempted to commit
a class A felony or murder.” MO. REV. STAT. § 563.051.3(3) (West 2013).  In Missouri, class
A felonies include identity theft in excess of fifty thousand dollars, id. § 570.223.3(5), dis-
tribution of a controlled substance near schools, id. § 195.214.2, a park, id. § 195.217.2, or
public housing, id. § 195.218.2.  Several other jurisdictions have statutes that are ambigu-
ous as to when deadly force may be used to stop or seize a non-dangerous fleeing felon and
have no court decisions interpreting the statute post-Garner. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-4009.4 (West 2013) (“Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person . . .
in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to apprehend any person for any felony . . . .”);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 733.3 (West 2012) (same).
13 Couch, 461 N.W.2d at 684 (“Garner’s pronouncements regarding the constitutional-
ity of the use of such force are inapplicable to private citizens . . . .”); Cooney, 463 S.E.2d at
599 (holding that Garner does not apply to private persons not acting as agents of the
state).
14 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 (1967) (describing the state action doctrine as the
“most important” issue in constitutional law); G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of
the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333,
340–54 (1997) (discussing the history and fundamental importance of the state action doc-
trine in constitutional law); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
503, 505–07 (1985) (suggesting that the doctrine should be abandoned, in part because of
its incoherence); Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Due Process of Self-Help; Flagg Bros.
Redux, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 48 (2000) (noting the widespread confusion surrounding the
doctrine); Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
663, 663–77 (1995) (discussing the importance of the doctrine and the confusion sur-
rounding it).
15 E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).  The Thirteenth
Amendment, which directly prohibits both private and government actors from engaging
in slavery or involuntary servitude, is the sole exception. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
16 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 552 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing private
actors).
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tion exception, imposes constitutional restrictions on private actors when
they perform certain functions traditionally and exclusively performed by the
government.17  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decisions discussing the
doctrine and applying the exceptions have not been a “model of consis-
tency,”18 and scholars have long regarded the exceptions as a “conceptual
disaster area.”19
This Article seeks to clarify the state action doctrine by reconsidering the
purpose of the doctrine and its exceptions and redefining the public func-
tion exception so that it better fulfills its purpose.20  First, it critically scruti-
nizes the historical justification for the state action doctrine—enhancing
federalism and individual autonomy21—and explains why these rationales
are inadequate.  Although the state action doctrine may enhance federalism
and autonomy, its raison d’eˆtre can more generally be described as the preven-
tion of government tyranny.  Similarly, the exceptions seek to ensure that the
Constitution’s protections of individual liberties apply to all infringement
attributable to the government, even if the most immediate cause of the
infringement is the act of a private party.  While the state action doctrine
prevents direct abuse of government power, the exceptions to the state
action doctrine prevent government abuse through the use of private
proxies.
Second, the Article maintains that the “traditional and exclusive” state
performance test of the public function exception improperly limits the
application of the exception.22  The definition freezes “into law a static con-
ception of government” and formulates a judicial test for state action that
“cease[s] to resemble contemporary experience.”23  More fundamentally, the
test improperly defines governmental functions, not by the nature of the
activity, but by the historic exclusive governmental status of the actors per-
forming the task.  This test is sufficient only if the government has not histori-
17 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974) (declining to recog-
nize the provision of electric utility services as a public function because it is not tradition-
ally the exclusive prerogative of the state); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966)
(finding the operation of a municipal park to be a public function); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (plurality opinion) (holding that the duplication of election
processes violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946) (disallowing a state-enabled company to run a town that violates liberties); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88–89 (1932) (holding that disallowing minority voting in primary
elections was a way for the state to racially discriminate); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at
552 (mentioning the exceptions when the government has a duty to protect).
18 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991).
19 Black, supra note 14, at 95; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 552 (describing the R
sharply different views of Supreme Court Justices in cases on the topic).
20 See infra Parts III–IV.
21 See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 306
(2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (mentioning individual freedom); Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (discussing federalism).
22 See infra Section III.B.
23 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 550 n.1 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cally delegated basic governmental power or tasks to private actors.  But in
fact, the government has often delegated governmental functions, sometimes
because of a lack of government resources to perform the tasks and some-
times because private actors could achieve the government’s end free from
constitutional limitations on the means.24  Under the current test, neither
law enforcement nor the private use of deadly force is a public function
because the government has not traditionally and exclusively performed
either task.
To correct the problems with the current test, this Article advances an
alternative formulation of the public function exception that focuses on the
governmental nature of the function being performed rather than the exclu-
sive history of government performance.25  I call this exception the non-dele-
gable governmental duty exception because it is analogous to the non-
delegable duty doctrine in tort law.  It holds the government responsible for
infringements of individual liberties caused by the delegation of certain gov-
ernmental functions involving peculiar risks of abuse if those performing the
function are not constitutionally constrained.26  It utilizes social contract the-
ory and the related concept of limited government to identify the non-dele-
gable governmental functions.  Social contract theory identifies law making,
adjudication, and law enforcement as non-delegable government functions
because these tasks create unique dangers when left in the hands of self-
interested private parties.  The peculiar dangers involved in the performance
of these functions require that where the government allows private persons
to perform these functions, the private person must act under the same limi-
tations constitutionally imposed on government actors.
The Article begins in Part I with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s
opinion and holding in Tennessee v. Garner.27  It then describes the continu-
ing application of the fleeing felon rule to private actors despite the Court’s
holding in Garner.28
Part II describes the state action doctrine, examines its history, and clari-
fies its purpose.  It explains why the Court’s early focus on enhancing individ-
ual autonomy and federalism as the purpose of the state action doctrine was
only partially correct.  In fact, the doctrine enhances many of the familiar
constitutional strategies for the prevention of tyranny including: separation
of powers, democratic elections, jury trials, the Bill of Rights, equal protec-
24 See infra Section III.B.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 The non-delegable duty doctrine is an exception to the general tort rule that a
principal is not responsible for the torts of independent contractors.  Non-delegable duties
apply to activities that are inherently dangerous or create a particular risk of harm if special
precautions are not taken. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 337 (2000) (defining
non-delegable duties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965) (describing
dangerous work).
27 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985).
28 See infra Part I.
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tion, due process, and federalism.  The state action doctrine, in effect, turns
the Constitution on and off to prevent government tyranny.
Part III describes the two exceptions to the state action doctrine—the
entanglement exception and the public function exception—and applies
them to the private use of deadly force.  It demonstrates—through a review
of applicable cases and hypotheticals—that the entanglement exception
applies only to the relatively rare cases when the state plays an active role by
commanding, encouraging, or facilitating the private use of deadly force.  It
also explains the flaws of the traditional and exclusive government perform-
ance test for the public function exception and why that test fails to encom-
pass the private use of deadly force to seize criminal suspects.
Part IV, the final and most significant section, discusses the proposed
alternative non-delegable governmental duty exception.29  It puts theory to
practice by applying the proposed exception to the private use of deadly
force to seize non-dangerous fleeing felons.30  It establishes that the use of
deadly force to seize non-violent criminals is a non-delegable governmental
function subject to constitutional limits even when private actors exercise
that force.31  It also demonstrates how the non-delegable governmental func-
tion exception helps to explain and unify the seemingly inconsistent and
patchwork history of the Supreme Court’s state action decisions.32
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FLEEING FELON RULE: TENNESSEE
V. GARNER
On the night of October 3, 1974, two Memphis police officers
responded to a report of a prowler inside a residence.33  When the officers
arrived at the scene, a neighbor reported she had heard glass breaking next
door and believed someone had broken into the home.34  One officer ran to
the back of the house where he heard a door slam and observed what he
believed to be a small, teenaged male run across the backyard and stop at the
base of a six-foot high chain-link fence.35  The officer did not observe any
weapons, and he was reasonably certain that the suspect was unarmed.36
Despite a command to halt, the suspect began to climb the fence.37  Believ-
ing that the suspect would escape if he got over the fence, the officer shot the
boy in the back of the head.38  The suspect later died on the operating
29 See infra Part IV.
30 See infra Section IV.B.
31 See infra Section IV.B.
32 See infra Section IV.C.
33 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id. at 4 & n.3.  The officer stated that because he was wearing a lot of equipment
and heavy boots, he thought he would have trouble getting over the fence and the younger
suspect would have been able to outrun him. Id.
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table.39  The police discovered ten dollars and a purse taken from the house
on the boy’s body.40  The suspect was a fifteen-year-old eighth-grader named
Edward Garner, who stood just five feet, four inches tall and weighed a little
over one hundred pounds.41
Garner’s father sued the City of Memphis and the Memphis Police
Department, asserting that the police officer’s use of deadly force violated
Garner’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.42  The trial court partially dismissed the suit on the basis of a Tennes-
see statute that authorized police officers to “use all the necessary means to
effect the arrest” of a suspect that fled or forcibly resisted arrest after notice
of the officer’s intention to arrest him.43  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that the killing of the suspect under the circum-
stances was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.44  The
Supreme Court subsequently granted the city’s petition for certiorari.45
The defendants’ primary argument before the Court was that the pre-
vailing common law rule at the time of the adoption of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments allowed the use of deadly force if necessary to arrest a
fleeing felon.46  If the use of deadly force was permissible under the common
law when the Fourth Amendment was ratified, the defendants argued, how
could it be a constitutionally unreasonable seizure?
In a six to three decision, the Court rejected this argument as a mistaken
literalism in light of the legal and technological changes that rendered the
prior justification for the rule obsolete.47  At the time the common law rule
developed, suspected felons were generally regarded as dangerous by virtue
of the crimes they allegedly committed and virtually all felonies were punish-
able by death.48  Thus, the use of deadly force “merely [resulted in] a speed-
39 Id. at 4.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 4 n.2.
42 Id. at 4.  Garner also sued the police officer, the director of the police department,
and the mayor of the City of Memphis.  The claims against the mayor and director were
dismissed for lack of evidence, and the police officer was ultimately recognized as acting in
good faith reliance on the Tennessee statute authorizing the use of force to prevent the
escape, therefore enjoying qualified immunity. Id. at 5.
43 Id. at 4.
44 Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 710 F.2d 240, 246 (6th Cir. 1983).
45 Garner, 471 U.S. at 6–7.
46 Id. at 12–13 (citing 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 85
(1736)).  Determining necessity requires a consideration of many factors, including:
whether a warning or command to halt was given, the distance between the arrestor and
arrestee, whether it was day or night, the weather, and obstructions preventing apprehen-
sion.  Some jurisdictions also required that the suspect be a felon in fact, while others
simply required a reasonable belief that the suspect committed a felony.  Day, supra note 9, R
at 290–97.
47 Garner, 471 U.S. at 13.
48 Id.  The Court also reasoned that the common law rule developed during a time
when the primitive state of weapons dictated that the application of deadly force typically
occurred during hand-to-hand struggles, which necessarily placed the arresting officer at a
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ier execution of someone who ha[d] already forfeited his life” and was a
danger to the community, albeit without the judicial finding of guilt and
punishment.49  Conversely, many felonies today do not carry the same infer-
ence that the alleged felon is dangerous, and only a few are punishable by
death.  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty even on those who have
been proven guilty of serious crimes such as burglary,50 robbery,51 and
rape.52  Therefore, the Court held that the use of deadly force is reasonable
only when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a danger
of serious physical harm to an officer or others, or when the suspect has
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm.53  Consequently, where the suspect poses no immediate
threat to an officer or others, the use of deadly force violates the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.54
While the Court’s ruling limited the use of deadly force to prevent the
suspect’s escape, it did not dramatically alter the policies of a vast majority of
the nation’s police departments.55  Most police departments had already
implemented policies prohibiting officers from using deadly force to appre-
hend a nonviolent fleeing felon.56  In fact, at the time Garner was decided,
more than half of the states had statutes or case law that restricted the com-
mon law rule, limiting the use of deadly force to situations in which the
officer reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent the immedi-
ate danger of serious physical injury to the officer or others.57  As a result,
the Court’s ruling in Garner merely changed the practices of the few police
departments that, like the Memphis Police Department, had retained the
broad common law fleeing felon rule.58
greater risk of harm. See id. at 14–15.  Today, police officers are uniformly equipped with
firearms that allow for the use of deadly force from a safe distance.
49 Id. at 14.
50 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982)).
51 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800–01 (holding that capital punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment for felony murder during a robbery where codefendant committed the
murders and defendant did not intend that deadly force be used).
52 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446–47 (rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598
(1977) (rape of an adult).
53 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 18 (citing C. MILTON ET AL., POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 45–46 (1977)).
56 Id.
57 Id.  The Court noted that this limitation on the use of deadly force was required for
accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Incor-
porated (CALEA).  CALEA is a credentialing agency that primarily accredits law enforce-
ment agencies and creates national guidelines for law enforcement officials. See The
Commission, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/content/commission (last visited Nov. 24,
2013).
58 Garner, 471 U.S. at 18–19.
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But while Garner made it clear that the Constitution restricts the use of
deadly force by police officers, the decision did not determine whether the
Constitution also prohibits private persons from using deadly force to pre-
vent the escape of non-dangerous felons.59  At common law, both law
enforcement officers and private citizens were privileged to use deadly force
to secure the arrest of felons.60  Although the Supreme Court rejected the
common law rationales for the fleeing felon rule, several states continue to
allow private citizens to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a nonvio-
lent fleeing felon.61
For example, a Houston homeowner was awakened around six o’clock
in the morning on January 10, 2010, by his home security alarm system.62
Looking out of his second-floor bedroom balcony, the homeowner observed
a teenaged suspect walking away with his television set.63  The suspect was not
armed and the homeowner did not believe that he was in danger.  Neverthe-
less, the homeowner shot the suspect, who dropped the television and
jumped a fence before he collapsed and died from his wounds.64  The home-
owner reportedly stated that he did not want to kill the burglar but that he
“didn’t want him to get away” either.65
Despite his use of deadly force, the homeowner escaped criminal
charges and civil liability because Texas law permits private persons to use
deadly force if the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to prevent
a robbery or burglary suspect from fleeing with the actor’s property.66  In
contrast, if a Houston police officer had shot the suspect under similar cir-
cumstances, he would have been liable for civil damages under federal law67
59 See People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Mich. 1990) (“Garner’s pronouncements
regarding the constitutionality of the use of such force are inapplicable to private
citizens . . . .”).
60 Day, supra note 9, at 286–87 (discussing the history and requirements of the com- R
mon law fleeing felon rule).
61 See supra note 12. R
62 Anita Hassan, ‘I Didn’t Want Him to Die’—Man Who Shot Teen, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan.
10, 2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6808245.html.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.42 (West 2011).  In pertinent part, the statute provides:
A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangi-
ble, movable property: . . . (2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the
deadly force is immediately necessary: . . . (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing
immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft dur-
ing the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes
that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other
means . . . .
Id.
67 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a federal civil cause of
action for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution”
caused by a person acting under color of state law.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  The plaintiff
may name the individual state actor as a defendant as well as local public entities and
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for his unconstitutional use of deadly force and might have faced criminal
prosecution.68  Although Texas and a few other states continue to permit
private citizens to use deadly force to prevent the escape of fleeing nonvio-
lent felons, whether this violates the constitutional rights of the suspect is a
very complicated problem, the resolution of which is determined by the state
action doctrine.
II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: THE CONSTITUTION’S POWER SWITCH FOR
THE PREVENTION OF TYRANNY
The state action doctrine provides that the Constitution’s protections of
individual liberties, as well as its requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection, constrain only government action.69  The Supreme Court first articu-
lated the doctrine in its decision in the Civil Rights Cases.70  The Court held
that the rights and privileges secured by the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibit state laws and proceedings that discriminate on the basis of race, but
they do not prohibit private racial discrimination.71  Therefore, the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination by privately owned
and operated inns, common carriers, theaters, and other places of public
amusement, was unconstitutional because it directly prohibited private racial
discrimination rather than invalidating or redressing discrimination by state
or local governments.72  The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
only empowered Congress to remedy state action.  It did not permit Congress
to cure a state’s failure to enact legislation to prevent private discrimination.
To hold otherwise, the Court insisted, would permit Congress to supersede
state law with its own “code of municipal law regulative of all private rights
between man and man in society.”73
This distinction between a state action that causes private harm and a
state’s mere failure to prohibit private conduct remains a touchstone of the
state action doctrine, and courts have broadly applied the distinction in sub-
sequent decisions.74  Without this distinction, almost any private action that
municipalities. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (naming the officer,
the police department, and the City of Memphis as defendants).  States however, are not
“persons” that may be sued as a defendant under § 1983.  Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  Where a federal official causes the violation of a constitu-
tional right, the Court has created a common law remedy where Congress has not provided
an adequate statutory remedy. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971).
68 See, e.g., State v. Mantelli, 42 P.3d 272, 273–74 (N.M. 2002) (appealing police
officer’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter after shooting a suspect attempting to flee).
69 E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 507 & n.1 (noting that the “state action doc-
trine” is a misnomer as it applies to all levels of federal, state, and local government).
70 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 16–18.
73 Id. at 13.
74 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175–77 (1972) (declining to
find state action where the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board licensed a private club to
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infringed on a person’s liberty interests could be blamed on the govern-
ment’s failure to prohibit the offending conduct.75  Unless an exception to
the state action doctrine is applicable, the government is not constitutionally
responsible for, and the Constitution does not prevent private interference
with, liberty.76  In order to determine when the exceptions should apply the
Constitution’s protection to nominally private interference with individual
rights, we must clearly identify the purpose of the doctrine and the
exceptions.
From its initial decision in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court has steadily
maintained that the state action doctrine serves to enhance federalism and
protect individual autonomy.77  However, this rationale is at once both too
broad and too specific.  It is too broad because the state action doctrine does
not necessarily result in a net increase in individual autonomy.78  It is too
specific because, as we will see, the state action doctrine enhances the Consti-
tution’s separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government, as well as the division of power between state and
federal governments.79  It also protects the Constitution’s other structural
and procedural means of controlling government abuse of power, such as
jury selection and elections.80  The purpose of the state action doctrine is to
prevent the abuse of government power, and it does so in ways that are obvi-
ous and direct and in other ways that are more indirect and obscure.
The state action doctrine can be thought of as an “on and off” switch for
the Constitution’s protection of individual liberties.  When the government
acts, the Constitution’s protection of basic liberties and its guarantees of due
serve liquor despite the club’s racially discriminatory membership rules).  In Moose Lodge,
the state could have conditioned receipt of the liquor license on allowing membership to
all races, but the state’s failure to do so was not enough to find state action. Id.
75 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 570; Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal The-
ory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982) (sug-
gesting that legal “positivism potentially implicates the state in every ‘private’ action not
prohibited by law”).
76 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); see discussion infra
Sections III.A–B and Part IV.
77 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 306 (2001)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Lugar, 457 U.S. at
936; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9.
78 See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 536 (questioning whether the overall effect of R
the state action doctrine enhances individual liberty when it sacrifices the liberty interest of
the victim of the private action protected by the state action doctrine); see also infra notes
86–87 and accompanying text (identifying the constraining effects of progressive expan-
sion of Congress’s legislative power).
79 See infra notes 97–108 and accompanying text; see also William P. Marshall, Diluting
Constitutional Rights: Rethinking “Rethinking State Action,” 80 NW. U. L. REV. 558, 566 (1985)
(“[A] doctrine of constitutional law that imposes judicially created parameters on private
conduct places serious constraints on the ability of both the common law and legislatures
to respond to social issues.”).
80 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936; see infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text; infra Sections
IV.C.1–2.
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process and equal protection turn on to prevent the abuse of government
power.81  In this way, the state action doctrine does protect individual auton-
omy.  Conversely, when only private action is involved, turning off the Consti-
tution, as the Court has recognized, also preserves an area of individual
freedom from the constitutional constraints imposed upon government
actors.82  Turning off the Constitution also serves to enhance federalism by
reserving the task of regulating private conduct to state and local
governments.83
However, federalism does not necessarily increase individual auton-
omy.84  The state action doctrine frees private conduct from constitutional
constraint, but it has always been within the states’ prerogative to restrict pri-
vate conduct in the same ways that the Constitution restricts state actors.85
To be sure, as a result of a progressive expansion of Congress’s legislative
powers, both state and federal governments possess the power to enact, and
have enacted, laws that impose restrictions on private conduct that in many
instances mirror the constitutional restrictions on state actors.86  In fact, in
some instances, private action is constrained by state and federal law far
beyond the constitutionally imposed restrictions on government actors.87
Even in the absence of state and federal laws, the state action doctrine
does not necessarily result in a net gain of individual autonomy.  Private free-
dom of action fostered by the state action doctrine is often offset, to a greater
or lesser extent, by the constraining effect the private action has on the free-
81 See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 930; United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966).
82 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 306 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tarkanian, 488
U.S. at 191; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9.
83 See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 306 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at
191; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936.
84 See James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 837, 967–71 (2004) (discussing Madison’s proposal, which was ultimately
rejected, for a constitutional provision granting the federal government the power to veto
state laws as a means of preventing tyranny of the majority at the state and local level).
85 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 79, at 559.
86 E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964)
(upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, which included
provisions outlawing private racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, as
within Congress’s Commerce Clause power); James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitution-
ality: How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 162–68 (2000) (concluding that the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s regulation of private employment is a permissible exercise of Congress’s
powers under the Commerce Clause); Marshall, supra note 79, at 559 (noting that the
federal power to regulate is nearly coextensive with that of states).
87 Many aspects of tort and criminal law that are used to constrain private actors do
not apply to some government actors as a result of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity,
legislative immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and related doctrines. See Steven F. Huefner,
The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221,
225 (2003) (describing the immunity given to both legislators and their staff members);
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 28 (1990) (“[J]udges possess a substantial degree of immunity from civil liability.”).
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dom of others.88  For example, the government may not punish a person
who burns the American flag as an expression of his opposition to govern-
ment policy because the First Amendment protects this type of speech.89  A
private employer, however, may fire or refuse to hire the flag burner because
the employer disapproves of the message or the mode of expression.90  The
chilling effect of the employer’s retaliation may more effectively silence the
employee’s political expression than the threat of a misdemeanor criminal
conviction.91  Nevertheless, the First Amendment does not directly apply to
purely private action, even if the private action has the effect of interfering
with free expression.92  These conflicting private liberty interests result in the
gain and loss of autonomy without constitutional oversight.
If maximizing individual liberty was the primary purpose of the state
action doctrine, perhaps we should, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has sug-
gested, abandon the doctrine in favor of direct judicial balancing of the pri-
vate actors’ conflicting constitutional liberties.93  Under his proposal, private
action that infringes upon constitutional rights would be subject to judicial
balancing of the competing interests and would be permissible only upon
proof of an adequate justification.94  The degree of constitutional protection
might vary depending upon whether the actor is a private party or a state
actor, but the Constitution would apply to both.95  In the case of the flag-
burning protester, therefore, a court would balance the employer’s freedom
of association and speech—if discharging the employee is thought of as
speech—against the employee’s freedom of speech.  And if the employee’s
rights were unjustifiably infringed, the employer’s conduct would be uncon-
stitutional.  This approach would force courts to consider the relative weight
of the conflicting liberties rather than sweep the entire conflict under the
state action rug.96
88 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 536 (“[E]very time a person’s freedom to R
violate a constitutional right is upheld, a victim’s liberty is sacrificed.”); Marshall, supra
note 79, at 561–63 (discussing several examples). R
89 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06, 420 (1989).
90 See, e.g., Patricia Sa´nchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 88–92 (2012) (discussing how restrictions
on private employees’ off-duty speech squelches free expression).
91 Id.; David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21, 46–49
(1998) (discussing the increasing levels of private employer censorship and proposing fed-
eral legislation to protect freedom of expression).  In this example, the loss of autonomy
can be thought of as self-imposed because the employee may still burn the flag if he is
willing to suffer the consequences of being fired by his private employer or suffer criminal
sanctions.  To a more limited degree, the same may be said with regard to any civil or
criminal sanctions.  Of course, if criminalized, that state might physically prevent the flag
burner’s crime if the state knows of the protester’s intent.
92 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521–23 (1976).
93 Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 551. R
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 550–51.
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What Chemerinsky overlooks, however, and what is commonly misun-
derstood, is that the state action doctrine has a profound impact on the Con-
stitution’s ability to prevent government tyranny, not simply by protecting
individual autonomy, but by preserving the Constitution’s separation of pow-
ers.97  By turning off the Constitution’s protections of individual rights when
only private action is involved, the state action doctrine ensures that state and
federal legislatures, rather than the judiciary through constitutional interpre-
tation, regulate private disputes over conflicting liberties.  This aspect of the
state action doctrine is critical not because it promotes autonomy—although
it often does—but because it safeguards the Constitution’s separation of pow-
ers between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.
Eliminating the state action doctrine in favor of a judicial weighing of
competing private liberties through constitutional interpretation, as Chemer-
insky proposes, is unacceptable because it fosters judicial tyranny.98  Without
the state action doctrine, almost all disputes between private persons over
conflicting liberties would take on constitutional significance.99  Judicial res-
olution of private disputes through constitutional interpretation would usurp
97 The role of the state action doctrine in safeguarding the Constitution’s division of
governmental power was recognized by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases.  See 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883).  However, the Court focused on federalism—the division of power between the
state and federal governments—rather than the division of power between the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government in both the state and federal system.  As
will be discussed in Section III.B, the original balance of power between the state and
federal government fostered democracy’s own unique form of oppression: tyranny of the
majority.  Indeed, inasmuch as the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution were necessary to correct flaws in the original distribution of power
between the state and federal governments, the Court’s focus on federalism should have
been of secondary importance. See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Constitution Libertarian?, 2009
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 24–26 (discussing how the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
help to fix the original flaws in the Constitution—from a libertarian perspective—by
expanding the power of Congress and the courts to protect against state infringements of
individual rights); Liebman & Garrett, supra note 84, at 885–99 (discussing how the origi-
nal Constitution contained a flawed notion of federalism because it could do nothing to
prevent or cure infringements of minority rights at the hand of the majority in state and
local governments).
98 Professor Chemerinsky rejects this argument by simply prioritizing the protection of
individual liberties over separation of powers.  He also insists that the judiciary would only
act where the state and federal legislatures “failed to act to ensure the full protection of
personal liberties.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 553.  Of course this really begs the R
question because the judiciary would decide if the legislature has failed to fully protect
these new constitutional rights.  Even when the legislature acts to protect these new consti-
tutional rights, the innumerable variations on the ways private actors may infringe upon
the rights of others will prevent anything more than very general legislative guidance that
will require broad deference to judicial interpretation.
99 See Marshall, supra note 79, at 569–70.  Marshall maintains that elimination of the
state action doctrine will transform the Constitution from the protector of liberty from
government abuse to a “vehicle of regulation and annoyance” in everyday life. Id.
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much of the law-making function of state and federal legislatures.100  It
would also undermine the executive’s role in enforcing legislation by permit-
ting private persons to directly enforce their “constitutional rights” against
fellow citizens through private lawsuits.  By undermining the role of the polit-
ical branches of government, eliminating the state action doctrine would
place unprecedented power in the hands of the judiciary.101
Eliminating the state action doctrine would transform the Constitution
from a shield against government oppression into an inflexible and petty
micro-manager of private conduct.  The Constitution protects citizens’ basic
liberties from government infringement and requires due process and equal
protection of the law, even though it is often costly or inefficient to do so, in
order to prevent the abuse of government power.102  The Constitution toler-
ates this inefficiency only because of the unique risks associated with the
scope and nature of government power.103  Comparing and balancing the
conflicting liberties of private persons involves policy concerns, including
efficiency considerations, that are best left to the citizens’ elected representa-
tives in state and federal legislatures.104  Legislation, rather than judicial reso-
lution, allows for flexibility and experimentation in the laboratories of
democracy.105  Elected representatives, who serve as the voice of the people,
100 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Putting the Federal Judiciary Back on the Constitutional Track,
14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 783–84 (1998) (criticizing the judiciary for increasingly deciding
political issues through constitutional interpretation and thereby removing the most
important social and moral issues from the democratic process and depriving the citizens
of the “moral education that come[s] from resolving difficult issues and reaching a social
consensus”).
101 See Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected
a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 712 (2006) (arguing that private
attorney general suits undermine the separation of powers by eroding the executive
branch’s duty to execute the law); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits
and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1795–96 (1993) (arguing that private attorney
generals are incompatible with democratic principles and the Constitution’s creation of a
unitary executive in Article II).
102 E.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S 554, 571 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the Constitution “places a greater value on individual liberty than on efficient
judicial administration”); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 346 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (“[A]s with other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the onerous nature
of the protection [of a Seventh Amendment jury trial] is no license for contracting the
rights secured by the Amendment.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (“Indeed,
one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particu-
lar, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy govern-
ment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.”).
103 See Owens, 484 U.S. at 571 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (cautioning against the use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as a
tool for second guessing legislative efforts at economic regulations); Meese, supra note 100,
at 783.
105 See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
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may repeal or change the laws to achieve a practical compromise between
competing interests if circumstances change or a law proves unworkable.
Resolving private disputes over conflicting liberty interests through con-
stitutional interpretation, rather than through the political process, also
undermines democratic principles fundamental to American government.106
Because the federal judiciary is not directly answerable to the people,
enhancing judicial power significantly diminishes the people’s ability to pre-
vent government tyranny through the political process.107  Eliminating the
state action requirement would combine the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial functions into a single entity insulated from the political process and
transform the judiciary into the most dangerous branch of government.108
In short, the state action doctrine is essential to preserving the separa-
tion of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government at both the federal and state level.  Correspondingly, the excep-
tions ensure that the government cannot circumvent the constitutional limi-
tations on its power by collaborating with, or delegating power to, private
actors who are willing to do what the government is constitutionally forbid-
den to do.
III. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRIVATE ACTION
The basic state action doctrine is relatively simple and application of the
doctrine is easy enough when the harm complained of is directly attributable
to action at either extreme of the government-private continuum.  But the
nation has changed in ways unimaginable to both the Founding Fathers and
the drafters of the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution.109  The
size of the federal and state governments and the pervasive scope of govern-
ment involvement in private life make it difficult to conceptualize two clearly
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”).
106 This concern is at the heart of the substantive due process debate. See Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of busi-
ness and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of har-
mony with a particular school of thought.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (deferring to
legislative judgment in rejecting an economic substantive due process challenge to Wash-
ington’s Minimum Wages for Women Act); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 43
(1990); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603–04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for deciding social issues under the guise of constitutional interpreta-
tion because it removes the issue from the democratic process and imposes the view of the
“elite class” from which the Court is composed upon the entire nation); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
107 See, e.g., Meese, supra note 100, at 782–83.
108 See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
109 See Richard Stengel, One Document, Under Siege, TIME, July 4, 2011, at 1, available at
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2079445,00.html.
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distinct spheres—one governmental and the other private.110  Accordingly,
determining what action is subject to constitutional constraint becomes
uncertain when the two spheres overlap.
The Supreme Court has created two exceptions to the state action doc-
trine that apply when the harm is most directly caused by a private actor, but
responsibility for the harm is nevertheless fairly attributed to the government
and thus subject to constitutional constraint.111  These exceptions—the
entanglement exception and the public function exception—seek to apply
the Constitution’s protections of individual liberties to all infringement
attributable to the government, even if the most immediate cause of the
infringement is the act of a private party.  Although both exceptions prevent
the abuse of government power by private proxy, the public function excep-
tion applies only to activities that are governmental in nature,112 while the
entanglement exception applies when the joint action of government and
private actors violates constitutionally protected rights regardless of whether
the functions performed are governmental in nature.113  These exceptions
give guidance but do not provide a universal or talismanic test of state action,
and frequently, more than one exception may apply to a given set of facts.114
Therefore, the search for state responsibility is a question of “normative judg-
ment” that must be determined on a case-by-case basis.115
110 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974) (“While the principle
that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well
established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is ‘private,’ on the
one hand, or ‘state action,’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”).
111 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(“[S]tate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the
State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself.’” (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351)); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004 (1982).  The exceptions to the state action doctrine apply where “it can be said that
the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Id.
112 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627–28 (1991) (recognizing
as a public function the use of peremptory challenges to dismiss potential jurors); West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56–57 (1988) (recognizing a prison physician as performing a public
function); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (finding the operation of a municipal
park to be a public function); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (plurality opin-
ion) (recognizing primary elections as public functions); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
509 (1946) (holding the operation of a company town as public function); Nixon v. Con-
don, 286 U.S. 73, 88–89 (1932) (recognizing a public function with elections). But see
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358–59 (declining to recognize the provision of electric utility services
as a public function because it is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state).
113 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (“[The] activity may be state action when it results
from the State’s exercise of ‘coercive power,’ when the State provides ‘significant encour-
agement, either overt or covert,’ or when a private actor operates as a ‘willful participant in
joint activity with the State or its agents.’” (citations omitted)).
114 Id. at 295–96.
115 Id. at 295.
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A. The Entanglement Exception: Joint Public and Private Action
The entanglement exception assesses government responsibility for
infringement of a constitutionally protected liberty in the same way that tort
law determines causation and apportionment of liability in a joint tortfeasors
case.116  The exception evaluates the government’s role in the private action
and applies when the state commands, encourages, or facilitates private per-
sons to take an action that the government is constitutionally prohibited
from directly doing.117  Accordingly, the entanglement exception is not so
much an exception as it is a means of determining whether the government’s
action is sufficient to hold it responsible for infringements of individual
rights most directly caused by a private actor.  As we will see, the entangle-
ment exception applies only in the relatively rare cases where the state plays
an active role in the private use of deadly force.
1. Government Compulsion
When the state commands or coerces the conduct of private actors,
whether by statute or custom with the force of law, a court will attribute the
private actor’s conduct to the state.118  Under such circumstances, the con-
duct is attributed to the state even if the private person would have taken the
same action regardless of the state’s direction because of the private person’s
personal motivations.119  These are relatively simple cases because the private
action is compelled by the state.  Regardless of whether the private actor
would have chosen the same action without the government’s mandate, the
government’s command is sufficient to activate constitutional protections.120
Even if a person abhors the law, he must comply with it or face state
sanctions.
While some states allow private persons to use deadly force under cir-
cumstances in which it would be unconstitutional for the state to use such
force, no state compels or commands citizens to use such force as a matter of
course.  Several states, however, do compel private citizens to assist police
officers in making arrests when the police officer gives the citizen a direct
command at the scene.121  In these jurisdictions, if an officer directed an
116 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 26,
28 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 10 (2000).
117 See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296.  The Court has also articulated a less rigid
application when the private actor is “ ‘entwined with governmental policies,’ or when gov-
ernment is ‘entwined in [the private entity’s] management or control.’” Id. (quoting
Evans, 382 U.S. at 299, 301).
118 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (holding that when the state
has compelled the action, whether by statute or custom with the force of law, it is state
action even if the private person would have acted the same way in the absence of state
coercion).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-5 (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 150 (West 2012); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-4-24 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regular Session); OR.
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armed citizen to use deadly force to apprehend a nonviolent felon, the pri-
vate use of force would presumably be attributed to the state regardless of the
private citizen’s desire to use deadly force independent of the officer’s com-
mand.122  Where the state compels the private citizen to act, the responsibil-
ity for the decision to use deadly force—whether the private actor finds the
act abhorrent or gratifying—must be attributed to the state and not solely to
the private citizen.
2. Government Encouragement
The Supreme Court has also stated that significant state encouragement
of private action may justify holding the state responsible for a private actor’s
harm.123  The government encouragement must be significant enough that
the responsibility for the private action is properly attributable to the state.124
Although the degree of government encouragement deemed significant will
vary,125 mere approval of, or acquiescence to, the private conduct is not suffi-
cient.126  Mere government knowledge of private action, without government
inducement, that, by “happy coincidence,” serves the government’s purpose
is insufficient to constitute state action.127
In the Old West, for example, the government occasionally encouraged
the private use of deadly force by offering rewards for the capture of fugitives
from justice “dead or alive.”128  These types of rewards predated the
REV. STAT. ANN. § 206.050 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-15-70 (2012); WIS. STAT.
§ 946.40 (2013). See generally, Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery,
Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 5–6, 10
(2008) (discussing the history and abuse of temporarily deputized citizens assisting law
enforcement).
122 See Peterson, 373 U.S. at 248.
123 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 166 (1978)); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)).  But see Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165 (holding
that state encouragement must involve more than mere inaction).
124 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
125 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468–70 (1973).
126 Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164–65.
127 United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 324, 326–28 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to find
state action in a mall security guard’s search and seizure of a firearm from suspected
shoplifter).
128 See, e.g., Umatilla Cnty. v. Estes, 208 P. 761, 761 (Or. 1922) (offering cash rewards
for the capture, dead or alive, of fugitives who had killed the county sheriff).  Many of the
Old West’s wanted posters were not issued by government entities but by private entities
who sought the capture or death of fugitives. See, e.g., Carr v. Mahaska Cnty. Bankers Ass’n,
269 N.W. 494, 495 (Iowa 1936) (banking association offered reward of $1000 for the cap-
ture, dead or alive, of bank robbers); Hoggard v. Dickerson, 165 S.W. 1135, 1136, 1140
(Mo. Ct. App. 1914) (enforcing private offer of $5000 reward for capture, dead or alive, of
the killer of a man’s friend); Madsen v. Dakota State Bank, 114 N.W.2d 93, 93–94 (S.D.
1962) (granting reward to private citizen who provided information to the police that led
to the arrest of bank robbers); see also John F. Galliher et al., Abolition and Reinstatement of
Capital Punishment During the Progressive Era and Early 20th Century, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
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Supreme Court’s decision in Garner;129 therefore, the Court never deter-
mined whether the private use of deadly force to collect government rewards
constituted state action.  Furthermore, these rewards were typically reserved
for the capture of dangerous fugitives, where the use of deadly force might
well have been justifiable even under the subsequent restraints imposed by
the Court’s decision in Garner.
If the state offered rewards for the apprehension of nonviolent fugitives
“dead or alive” today, a court would likely attribute the private actor’s con-
duct to the state.130  Indeed, courts have held that a search conducted by
private persons, which assists the government and is motivated by the pros-
pect of a reward, must be treated as state action to effectuate the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.131  To treat them otherwise would allow the govern-
ment to circumvent the Constitution’s limitations on state power through
NOLOGY 538, 560–62 (1992) (discussing reward for the capture of an African-American
charged with the murder of a white girl in Colorado after Colorado had abolished the
death penalty).
129 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
130 In comparison, modern-day bounty hunters are not typically treated as state actors
because they generally seek to collect rewards offered by private bail bondsmen rather
than by the government, and there is a contractual relationship between the fugitive and
the bail bondsman.  Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of
Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 731, 750–65 (1996).
When a bail bondsman posts bond for a defendant, a private contract is created between
the parties whereby the defendant implicitly consents to arrest by the bondsman or the
bondsman’s agent. Id. at 754–55, 764.  In the absence of a party posting bail, the defen-
dant remains incarcerated until trial. See id. at 758–61.  When the prisoner is turned over
to the bondsman, he remains under arrest and is subject to seizure by the bondsman with-
out the need for a warrant or any additional government process. Id. at 751–52, 756–57.
The seizure by the bondsman’s bounty hunter is a continuation of the original, constitu-
tionally reasonable state seizure. Id. at 751, 757.  Bondsmen have prisoners “on a string,
and may pull the string whenever they please” without implicating state action beyond the
original arrest that led to prisoner’s detention.  Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366,
371–72 (1872); see also Drimmer, supra, at 750–65 (discussing courts’ analyses of the pri-
vate contractual nature of the relationship between the bail bondsman and the
defendant).
131 United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 790–93 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an
airline employee’s search of a woman’s overnight case was state action where the employee
was looking for illegal drugs and the DEA had encouraged his conduct through the possi-
bility of cash rewards); see also United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 737–38 (7th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the circumstances under which a private actor becomes a government actor
such that the Fourth Amendment’s limitations apply and citing cases).
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private proxies.132  “The government may not do, through a private individ-
ual, that which it is otherwise forbidden to do.”133
3. Government Assistance and Symbiosis
While no deadly force cases are directly on point, courts have held that
bail bondsmen are state actors when they are aided or assisted by a state
actor.  For example, in Jackson v. Pantazes, the plaintiff sued a bail bondsman
and a police officer for using excessive force and unnecessarily damaging
property in the course of a forcible entry and search of her home, arguing
that her constitutional rights were violated.134  The plaintiff’s son was a fugi-
tive who failed to appear while out on bond, and the bondsman and two
police officers went to the plaintiff’s home to look for him.135  When the
plaintiff “denied” the bondsman and officers “permission to enter” her
home, the bondsman “shov[ed] the door into [the plaintiff]” and “forced his
way into” her home.136  One of the officers restrained the plaintiff while the
bondsman kicked open interior doors and damaged her property as he
searched the house.137  The plaintiff asked the officer if the bondsman’s
actions were lawful, and the officer told her that the bondsman “[could] do
whatever he want[ed].”138  Under these facts, the Fourth Circuit was satisfied
that the assistance the police officer provided to the bail bondsman was suffi-
cient to render the bondsman a state actor.139
The court also found, as an alternative rationale, that “the symbiotic
relationship” between the bail bondsman and the state criminal justice sys-
tem was sufficient “to render [the bondsman’s] conduct state action.”140
The state created the bail bond system and provided bondsmen with the
license upon which their livelihoods depended.141  In return, the state relied
132 See Feffer, 831 F.2d at 737–39 (finding state action only where “the government knew
of and acquiesced in” the private conduct, and the private party’s purpose for conducting
the search was the result of government inducement); see also United States v. Avery, No.
09-CR-196, 2010 WL 1541342, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (applying the Feffer rationale
but finding no state action under the facts); Matje v. Leis, 571 F. Supp. 918, 921, 926–27
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that an informant can be a state actor when the informant’s
action is motivated by government payment or promise of leniency).
133 Feffer, 831 F.2d at 737.
134 810 F.2d 426, 427 (4th Cir. 1987).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 427–28.
137 Id. at 428.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 429.
140 Id. at 430.  “[B]oth parts of the Lugar test are satisfied where the nature of the
relationship between the state and private actors is one of interdependence, or ‘symbio-
sis.’” Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
141 Id.
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upon bondsmen to “facilitate the pretrial release of accused persons,”142 sav-
ing the state the expense of incarceration.143
It is unlikely, however, that the symbiosis rationale remains viable.
Although the symbiosis rational in Jackson v. Pantazes was based upon the
Supreme Court’s decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,144 the
Court has subsequently cast significant doubt upon the continuing vitality of
this theory.145  The Court has declined to expand the symbiotic relationship
rationale in Burton beyond its specific facts, which involved private lessees of
public property.146
While several courts have found that bail bondsmen are state actors
when they are assisted by police officers,147 no court has expressly followed
the symbiosis rationale absent direct state assistance, and several courts have
expressly rejected the symbiosis rationale.148  Therefore, without some direct
involvement by and assistance from a state actor, it is unlikely that a court
would treat a private person’s use of deadly force to apprehend a nonviolent
felon as state action based on this symbiosis rationale alone.  Furthermore,
under existing law, merely exercising a state-created right that may further a
state interest, without more direct assistance from a state official, is insuffi-
cient to support a finding of state action under the entanglement exception.
When the state is not commanding, encouraging, or otherwise actively facili-
142 Id.
143 Drimmer, supra note 130, at 758–60.
144 365 U.S 715 (1961).
145 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357–58 (1974) (noting that the holding
in Burton was limited to lessees of public property).  In Burton, a state-owned and operated
parking facility rented out space to a coffee shop that refused to serve persons of color.
Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–26.  The state provided the coffee shop with a building and a prime
location in exchange for rent payments and an increased demand for parking by the
shop’s customers. Id. at 718–19, 724.  The Court found that this mutually beneficial rela-
tionship between the state and the coffee shop was sufficient to attribute the responsibility
for the discrimination to the state. Id. at 724–26.
146 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358.
147 Id.; see also Bailey v. Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 1511, 1514, 1523 (D. Kan. 1992) (noting
that the “active, concerted action of the police with [the bondsman]” allowed the court to
find “sufficient facts from which a jury could find that [the bondsman] acted under color
of state law for § 1983 purposes”).
148 See, e.g., Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 205 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We
are not persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s finding that the relationship between bail bonds-
men and the state criminal court system is such that the actions of the bondsmen may be
fairly treated as [those] of the state itself.”); see also Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.4
(8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s symbiotic relationship theory); Ouzts v. Md.
Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he bail bondsman is in the business
in order to make money and is not acting out of a high-minded sense of devotion to the
administration of justice.”); McGregor v. Shane’s Bail Bonds, No. 10-CV-2099-JWL, 2010
WL 3155635, at *13 & n.25 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 2010) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s position),
aff’d sub nom. McGregor v. Snyder, 427 F. App’x 629 (10th Cir. 2011); Weaver v. James
Bonding Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s
position); McCoy v. Johnson, 176 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (rejecting the Fourth
Circuit’s position).
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tating the private use of deadly force, a court will not find state action unless
the public function exception applies.
B. The Public Function Exception: The Dysfunctional Traditional and Exclusive
Government Performance Test
The public function exception is a true departure from the state action
doctrine’s action/omission distinction.149  When it applies, a court will find
state action even where the government has passively permitted a private per-
son to perform certain governmental functions.150  The difficulty with the
public function exception is that it must distinguish between private action
that is governmental in nature and government action that is private in
nature.151  It cannot operate like King Midas’s touch152 and transform every
activity touched by the government into a governmental function subject to
constitutional constraint.  To be sure, the public function exception must be
limited to certain governmental functions in order to prevent the Constitu-
tion from completely controlling private conduct.  The Court aptly described
the need for a limiting principle in Evans v. Newton:
The range of governmental activities is broad and varied, and the fact that
government has engaged in a particular activity does not necessarily mean
that an individual entrepreneur or manager of the same kind of undertaking
suffers the same constitutional inhibitions.  While a State may not segregate
public schools so as to exclude one or more religious groups, those sects may
maintain their own parochial educational systems.153
In an effort to confine the public function exception, the Court has
declared that it applies only to activities that were traditionally and exclu-
sively performed by the state.154  For example, in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., the plaintiff sought to be guaranteed procedural due process from
an electric utility corporation before her electrical services could be termi-
nated.155  Rejecting the petitioner’s claim, the Court held that although the
government did actually own and operate some utilities, privately operated
149 See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. R
150 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1966) (attributing private opera-
tion of a city park to the state); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 475–76 (1953) (plurality
opinion) (finding state action within discriminatory primary elections); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 502, 509–10 (1946) (holding that Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, which
operated a corporate town, was a state actor); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88–89 (1932)
(holding discriminatory elections to qualify as state action).
151 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301.
152 In Greek Mythology, King Midas prayed for and was granted by the gods the power
to turn everything he touched into gold.  According to the myth, he died from hunger as
everything set before him was turned to gold. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 68 (Benjamin Jowett
trans., 1943).
153 Evans, 382 U.S. at 300 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
154 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352–58 (1974).
155 Id. at 347–48.
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utilities do not perform a public function because the operation of a utility is
not an activity traditionally and exclusively performed by the state.156
While application of the traditional and exclusive government perform-
ance test does limit the public function exception, the Court’s focus on a
history of exclusive performance is ill conceived for three reasons.  First, it
limits the application of the public function test to very few activities because
of the historically small scale of government, particularly compared to the
enormous and diverse entity familiar to us today.157  Second, the test incor-
porates and perpetuates the flaws in the original Constitution, which were
only remedied by constitutional amendments and relatively recent Court
decisions interpreting those amendments.158  Third, the test does not focus
on the purpose of the state action doctrine: the prevention of tyranny.  To
prevent tyranny through delegation to private actors, the public function test
must focus on the function of the activity rather than a history of exclusive
government performance.
A lack of government resources often necessitated that private parties
perform activities that, from a functional perspective, were clearly govern-
mental in nature.  For example, resource concerns led to the inclusion of a
provision in the United States Constitution that authorized the government
to issue Letters of Marque to privateers.159  Letters of Marque permitted
these privately owned warships to attack enemy shipping, allowing the gov-
ernment to conduct naval warfare without the commitment of vast public
resources.160  Likewise, in England, the victims of crimes, or private organiza-
tions, were once primarily responsible for the criminal prosecution of their
offenders because of a “reluctance to raise taxes to support public prosecu-
tions.”161  Yet surely, from a functional perspective, waging war and criminal
prosecutions must be regarded as governmental functions subject to constitu-
tional constraint because of their potential for tyrannical abuse.
156 Id. at 351 n.8, 353.  The Court also rejected the petitioner’s argument that the
essential nature of the service provided by the utility corporation was sufficient to convert
the corporation into a state actor. See id. at 353–54.  Defining the public function excep-
tion by the essential nature of the activity involved could transform every action of
“[d]octors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia’s upstate New York grocery
selling a quart of milk” into that of the state. Id.
157 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 550 n.1 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Such a limitation would be most imprudent, for it would freeze
into law a static conception of government, and our judicial theory of government action
would cease to resemble contemporary experience.”).
158 See Barnett, supra note 97, at 24–26; Liebman & Garrett, supra note 84, at 885–99.
159 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
160 Id.  The practice became unfeasible and unnecessary as modern standing militaries
became standard and was abolished by the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of
April 16, 1856. See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 391
n.144 (2009).
161 Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 659, 667–69, 749 (2010).
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Similar government resource shortages prevented modern police forces
from becoming commonplace in America until the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury.162  Private persons and organizations—such as the Pinkertons—played
an important and often notorious role in apprehending criminals.163  In fact,
despite our modern state and federal law enforcement organizations, private
individuals and private security agencies continue to play an important role
in apprehending criminals.164  Because of the Court’s history-based defini-
tion of the public function exception, private persons are not subject to the
same constitutional restrictions on the use of deadly force that restrict gov-
ernment law enforcement personnel.
Moreover, the Court’s current public function test—the traditional and
exclusive government performance test—perpetuates the effects of early con-
stitutional failures.165  Federalism was intended to be a tool to prevent tyr-
anny, but the Constitution’s original distribution of power between the
federal government and the states facilitated the rise of tyrannical political
majorities in state and local governments.166  The functions that the govern-
ment exclusively engaged in, shared with private parties, or left completely in
the hands of private parties were influenced by these original constitutional
failures.167  This problem is particularly troubling because the public func-
tion exception plays a critical role in preventing tyranny of the majority.  It
prevents the government, selected by political majorities, from delegating
governmental functions back to private actors as a means of circumventing
today’s broad constitutional protections for “discreet and insular minori-
ties”168—the very groups historically subject to oppression by both state and
private actors because of the original constitutional defects.
The Founding Fathers were aware of the dangerous potential of a tyran-
nical majority in the new democracy they were creating, and James Madison
offered the following warning in The Federalist No. 51:
162 David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1207–09 (1999).
163 Id. at 1211–17.
164 Id. at 1221–25.
165 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 550 n.1 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 See Liebman & Garrett, supra note 84, at 885–99; Thurgood Marshall, Commentary,
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“I
do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever ‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia
Convention.  Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the
framers particularly profound.  To the contrary, the government they devised was defective
from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transfor-
mation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the individual
freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.”).
167 See Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 101, 101–05 (2002) (explaining how the use of history in fundamental rights
analysis legitimizes and perpetuates prior discrimination and is contrary to the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
168 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against
the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the
injustice of the other part. . . . If a majority be united by a common interest,
the rights of the minority will be insecure. . . . In a society under the forms of
which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy
may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature . . . .169
Madison assumed that the vast diversity of interests and classes of citizens
in the new republic made it unlikely that any majority would become so
secure in its power as to be able or willing to deprive another group of its
fundamental rights.170  Unfortunately, history proved Madison’s approach
unjustifiably optimistic.  Because the Constitution’s protection of individual
liberties in the Bill of Rights did not originally apply to the states,171 the
political process was the primary check against the abuse of state power.
However, most Americans were denied the right to vote, to serve on juries, or
to otherwise participate in the political process.172  Of course, the greatest
abuse, slavery, was expressly sanctioned in the Constitution and led to the
costliest war in American history.173  Even the Civil War did not rein in the
oppression of the political majorities that controlled state and local
governments.174
The post-Civil War amendments did end slavery, and they might have
corrected the most atrocious violations of individual liberties by state and
local governments.  Certainly, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment could
have, and probably should have, been interpreted to apply the first eight
amendments of the Constitution to the state and local governments as “privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship.”175  Yet, in the Slaughter-House Cases,176
the Court rejected this interpretation in order to preserve for the states the
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323–24 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
170 Id. at 324–25.
171 See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment constrains the federal government but not the states).
172 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 32 (2005).
173 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1857) (“[T]he right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.”); MARK E. BRAN-
DON, FREE IN THE WORLD 6–7, 202 (1998).
174 See generally 4 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: THE AGE OF JIM CROW
(Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE AGE OF JIM CROW] (surveying the post-Civil
War laws passed to subordinate African-Americans).
175 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–88 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the states
but reaching that conclusion by rejecting the Slaughter-House Cases and applying the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges
or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1136–38, 1147 n.444, 1149
(2000).
176 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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primary role of governing their citizens, free from both constitutional cen-
sure and congressional control.177
In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court continued its misplaced focus on fed-
eralism when it should have focused on preventing tyranny of the majority.
Although the Court held that the states have no duty to prevent private dis-
crimination in public accommodations, the Court presumed that existing
state laws would provide a remedy against private interference of other, more
basic constitutional rights, stating:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such [state] author-
ity, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the
rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his prop-
erty, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not
done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presuma-
bly be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress.  An individual cannot
deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in
the courts, or to be a witness or a juror; he may, by force or fraud, interfere
with the enjoyment of the right in a particular case; he may commit an
assault against the person, or commit murder, or use ruffian violence at the
polls, or slander the good name of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in
these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot
destroy or injure the right; he will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or
punishment; and amenable therefor to the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are
committed.178
If, however, the Constitution does not compel the states to take affirma-
tive measures to remedy private violations of constitutional rights, how can
the Court assume that the states will provide redress through state civil and
criminal laws?
Apparently, the Court expected that the political process would ensure
that the states would provide legal redress.  If this was the Court’s assump-
tion, it learned few lessons from the majority’s use of the political process to
visit abuse upon minorities leading up to the Civil War, and the decisions in
The Slaughter-House Cases and The Civil Rights Cases perpetuated the problem.
For nearly a century after these decisions, many states actively passed legisla-
tion that deprived or infringed upon the right to vote, hold property, sue in
the court, and serve on juries.179  Jim Crow laws were unquestionably state
action, but generations of African-Americans suffered under their tyranny
and oppression before selective incorporation and federal legislation gradu-
ally eradicated them.180
177 See id. at 81–82.  Despite continuing scholarly and judicial criticism of the Slaughter-
House Cases’ narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has never
overruled this aspect of the case.
178 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (emphasis added).
179 See generally THE AGE OF JIM CROW, supra note 174 (surveying the post-Civil War laws
passed to subordinate African-Americans).
180 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1997j, 2000a–2000h-6 (2006).
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State and local governments also found more subtle ways to achieve simi-
lar deprivations of rights without taking direct action.  Political majorities,
through governmental inaction, effectively delegated governmental func-
tions to private persons free from the constitutional restraints designed to
protect individual rights.181  Private actors controlled primary elections,
operated segregated parks, prevented the sale of property to minorities, and
excluded minorities from jury service.  Even law enforcement was delegated
to private thugs and organizations such as the Pinkertons and the Ku Klux
Klan, who were free to seek vigilante justice without constitutional con-
straint.182  The public function exception became necessary to address the
failure of the political process to provide criminal and civil redress for private
interference with basic constitutional rights by those performing delegated
governmental functions.183
The traditional and exclusive governmental function test forces the
Court to confine its search for public functions to an examination of a distant
and troubled past.  Going forward, the scope of the public function excep-
tion must be defined by the nature of the function performed rather than by
the traditional and exclusive status of the actor performing the function.
Otherwise, the traditional and exclusive governmental function test will per-
petuate the effects of our flawed constitutional history.184
IV. A FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVE: THE NON-DELEGABLE GOVERNMENTAL
DUTY EXCEPTION
To determine which governmental functions must be subject to constitu-
tional protection even when performed by private actors, it is useful to draw
an analogy to tort law’s non-delegable duty doctrine.  The non-delegable
duty doctrine is an exception to the general rule that an employer of an
independent contractor is “not liable for the negligent acts of [the] indepen-
dent contractor.”185  Under the non-delegable duty doctrine, the employer
of an independent contractor is liable for the negligence of the contractor
when the work involves a “peculiar risk of physical harm” that requires the
181 Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L.
REV. 479, 524–25 (2012) (discussing the historical problem of delegation of law enforce-
ment to groups like the Ku Klux Klan who were free to seek vigilante justice without consti-
tutional constraint).
182 Id.
183 Similarly, the entanglement exception sought to apply constitutional constraint to
those instances where the government commanded, encouraged, or facilitated private par-
ties’ efforts to achieve ends that the government was prohibited from seeking directly. See
discussion supra Section III.A.
184 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 550 n.1 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting to the strict application of the traditional and exclusive
governmental function test because it would “freeze into law a static conception of
government”).
185 Pusey v. Bator, 762 N.E.2d 968, 972 (Ohio 2002). See generally DOBBS, supra note 26,
§ 337 (discussing non-delegable duties).
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exercise of “special precautions.”186  The employer may delegate the work to
an independent contractor, but she cannot delegate the responsibility or
duty to take the special precautions.187
Similarly, the public function exception ensures that special precautions
are taken to prevent violations of constitutional liberties when private per-
sons perform certain governmental functions.188  When the power or func-
tion is governmental in character, the government cannot, like Pontius
Pilate,189 wash its hands of the responsibility by delegating the task to private
actors who are not constitutionally constrained.190  The government may
delegate the task but not the responsibility, and the private actor performing
that governmental function must act within the constitutional limitations that
apply to the government.
186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965); see, e.g., Myers v. United States, 652
F.3d 1021, 1023–26, 1034–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the government had non-dele-
gable duty to ensure contractor hired to remove soil contaminated with dangerous com-
pounds from military bases and dispose of it in a landfill did not expose those living
adjacent to the landfill to harmful levels of contaminated soil dust).
187 Pusey, 762 N.E.2d at 972–73 (holding that an “employer may delegate the work to an
independent contractor, but he cannot delegate the duty”).
188 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462–63, 469 (1953) (plurality opinion) (find-
ing state action where the state permitted a duplication of its election process by private
party seeking to exclude African-Americans from voting in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
189 Pontius Pilate was the governor of Judea from twenty-six to thirty-seven AD. COLUM
HOURIHANE, PONTIUS PILATE, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND THE PASSION IN MEDIEVAL ART 11 (2009).
His responsibilities included serving as the judge who oversaw the trial of Jesus for sedition
and treason.  Although the details are controversial and disputed, the analogy I draw is
based upon the following version of events.  Pontius Pilate determined that the evidence
was insufficient to convict Jesus and believed he was innocent of the charges against him.
Although Pontius Pilate had the authority to determine guilt or innocence and to release
or punish Jesus, he delegated the decision to the mob, which demanded that Jesus be
crucified.  Pilate then symbolically washed his hands in a golden basin of water and pro-
claimed “my hands are clean of this man’s blood.” See PAUL L. MAIER, PONTIUS PILATE
219–38 (1968) (providing a factual, but fictional account of Pilate’s life). But see ANN
WROE, PONTIUS PILATE 221–84 (1999) (suggesting that Pilate did not struggle with the
decision to condemn Jesus and did so without equivocation or delegation).  Of course, if
the power to judge the case was Pilate’s, he cannot wash the responsibility away by delegat-
ing the authority to an angry crowd and allowing them to condemn an innocent man.  The
responsibility was his, and delegating the act to the crowd did not eliminate his responsibil-
ity for the crucifixion.  I often think of the governmental function exception as the “Pon-
tius Pilate Principle”: some functions are the sole responsibility of government, even if the
government delegates the performance of the function—actively or passively—to private
actors.
190 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 n.3 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A
State may not deliberately delegate a task to a private entity in order to avoid its constitu-
tional obligations.  But a State’s decision to delegate a duty to a private entity should be
carefully examined even when it has acted, not in bad faith, but for reasons of conve-
nience.  The doctrinal basis for the state action requirement is that exercises of state
authority pose a special threat to constitutional values.  A private entity vested with state
authority poses that threat just as clearly as a state agency.” (citation omitted)).
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The difficulty is identifying which governmental functions present spe-
cial dangers that require constitutional constraint, even when performed by
private actors191  To solve this problem, the proposed non-delegable govern-
mental duty exception looks to social contract theory and our Constitution’s
structural and procedural means of limiting government power under the
social contract.
A. The Constitution, Social Contract Theory, and Limited Government
It has become commonplace in constitutional dialogue to trumpet the
protection of individual liberty as the Constitution’s primary purpose.  This
sentiment is expressed by a popular quotation commonly, although perhaps
erroneously, attributed to Patrick Henry: “The Constitution is not an instru-
ment for the government to restrain the people, it is an instrument for the
people to restrain the government.”192  While this idea clearly resonates with
many Americans, it is in fact only a half-truth.193  Firstly and foremostly, the
Constitution created a federal government and contemplated state and local
governments capable of subjecting the people to government-created laws,
judicial process, and executive power.194  The government, created by the
consent of the people, is, in turn, constitutionally limited to ensure that life,
liberty, and property will not be subject to the equally destructive tyranny of
an all-powerful government.195  In The Federalist No. 51, Madison explained
the delicate balancing act assigned to the Founding Fathers in creating the
new government and in drafting the Constitution:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature?  If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary.  In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to con-
trol itself.196
This dichotomy—the need to impose government power on the people
while also controlling the government in order to protect individual liberty—
191 See id.
192 While this quotation is often attributed to Patrick Henry—especially on the
internet—there is considerable doubt that it was ever said by Patrick Henry. See Thomas S.
Kidd, Misquoting Patrick Henry: The Internet and Bogus Sayings of the Founders, BAYLOR INST.
FOR STUDIES OF RELIGION (Feb. 2, 2012), www.baylorisr.org/2012/02/misquoting-patrick-
henry-the-internet-and-bogus-sayings-of-the-founders-by-thomas-s-kidd/.
193 See, e.g., Stengel, supra note 109 (discussing constitutional debates surrounding cur-
rent events).
194 U.S. CONST. arts. I–III, amend. X.
195 Id. at amends. I–X.
196 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 169, at 322 (James Madison); see also THE FEDER-
ALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“No man is allowed to be
a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity.”).
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is the great problem that the Constitution sought to solve.197  And social con-
tract theory—as articulated in the works of Thomas Hobbes,198 Jean-Jacques
Rousseau,199 and John Locke200—largely informed the Founding Fathers in
solving this problem.  Social contract theory postulates that people consent
to government power in order to escape the lawlessness of the state of nature
where life, liberty, and property are subject to constant threats from
others.201
Locke’s work particularly influenced the Founding Fathers.202  Locke
identified three defects in the state of nature that necessitated the formation
of government.  Firstly, there is an absence of “established, settled, known
law.”203  Secondly, the state of nature lacks “a known and indifferent judge,
with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law.”204  Finally, there is a lack of “power to back and support” the law and
enforce judgments.205  To remedy these defects, each person willingly sur-
renders some autonomy to the government.206  In return, the government is
“obliged” to secure the life, liberty, and property207 of the people “by provid-
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 169, at 322 (James Madison).
198 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford Univ. Press 1929) (1651).
199 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Ernest Rhys ed., Everyman’s
Library, 1938) (1762).
200 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, reprinted in THE SECOND
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (J.W. Gough ed.,
Basil Blackwell 1948) (1690).
201 Thomas Hobbes is generally credited with first articulating the social contract the-
ory of government formation.  In his seminal work, Leviathan, Hobbes painted an unap-
pealing picture of life in the state of nature, free of government restraint. HOBBES, supra
note 198, at 96.  Hobbes believed that humans are fundamentally antisocial beings, moti-
vated by personal gain and self-preservation. Id.  Without government power to maintain
order, mankind would live in a constant state of war with one another. Id.  Hobbes
famously described life in this lawless state of nature as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short.” Id. at 97.  The desire to escape this uncertain and primal existence was the impetus
that drove men to submit to the authority of government. Id. at 100.  Locke had a more
generous view of human nature, believing men were fundamentally social creatures capa-
ble of rationally discovering natural laws. LOCKE, supra note 200, §§ 124–31.  Like Hobbes,
he believed that in the state of nature, man’s ignorance, bias, and self-interest obscured the
discovery of natural law and colored its application. Id.
202 So great was Locke’s influence on Jefferson that he considered Locke to be one of
the three greatest men in history. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New
Melody?  The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice
in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 201, 206 n.22 (2003) (citing a letter from Thomas
Jefferson to American painter John Trumbull in 1789, “referring to John Locke, Francis
Bacon, and Isaac Newton” as “‘the three greatest men that have ever lived’” and ordering
their portraits).
203 LOCKE, supra note 200, § 124.
204 Id. § 125.
205 Id. § 126.
206 Id. § 127.
207 Id. § 131.
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ing against [the] three defects above-mentioned that made the state of
nature so unsafe and uneasy.”208
Although Locke and Hobbes agreed that government was created to
impose law and order on the state of nature, they disagreed about the ideal
form of government and the extent of its power.  According to Hobbes, the
people completely surrendered government control to the collective political
body of the all-powerful Leviathan.  Once created, the power of Hobbes’s
Leviathan was absolute and irrevocable.209  In return, the sovereign con-
trolled the natural domineering ambitions of its subjects and provided secur-
ity and peace.210
Locke rejected Hobbes’s Leviathan, refusing to substitute an all-powerful
tyrant for the many petty tyrants of the state of nature.  Rather, Locke envi-
sioned a limited government empowered to correct the three defects of the
state of nature by performing legislative, judicial, and executive functions but
constrained by the terms of the social contract.211  However, if the govern-
ment became tyrannical—by exceeding the power granted to it by the social
contract212—the people had the right to dissolve the government, by violent
revolution if necessary, and replace the people in charge or the form of
government.213
Just as Madison sought to prevent the anarchy of the state of nature and
the tyranny of an all-powerful Leviathan government in drafting the Constitu-
tion, the public function exception must be formulated to prevent these two
forms of tyranny.  Firstly, the non-delegable governmental function excep-
tion must protect against the many petty tyrants of the lawless state of nature.
When private persons perform legislative, executive, or judicial functions,
they must be subject to the same constitutional restrictions that apply to state
actors.  Social contract theory identifies these tasks as non-delegable govern-
208 Id.
209 HOBBES, supra note 198, at 133–39.
210 Id.
211 LOCKE, supra note 200, §§ 143–48.
212 Id. § 199.
213 Id. §§ 212–20.  Thomas Jefferson breathed life into Locke’s theory in The Declaration
of Independence by rejecting the tyranny of King George III, who was the personification of
Hobbes’s Leviathan, in favor of a government limited to the powers expressly granted by
the people:
W[e] hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from
the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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mental functions because they create distinct risks of abuse when left in the
hands of self-interested private parties.
Secondly, the public function exception must also apply when private
action threatens to circumvent the structural and procedural means by which
the Constitution constrains the government to protect individual liberty.  For
example, as demonstrated in Part II, the state action doctrine plays an impor-
tant role in preserving the Constitution’s separation of powers by ensuring
that the political branches of government—through legislation and law
enforcement, rather than the judiciary, through constitutional interpreta-
tion—perform the initial task of balancing the conflicting liberties of purely
private actors.214  This also enhances the ability of our democracy to fight
government tyranny through the electoral process because the legislature
and the executive are elected, but the federal judiciary is not.215  However,
for elections to serve as a constraint on the government abuse of power, elec-
tions must also be considered a non-delegable governmental function.216  In
addition to elections, other methods of selecting people for participation in
legislative, judicial, or executive functions, such as jury service, must also be
treated as governmental functions subject to constitutional constraint.217
There are undoubtedly other constitutional structures and procedures that
are also non-delegable governmental functions.
The non-delegable governmental duty exception ensures that the Con-
stitution fulfills its goal of empowering the government to remedy the three
defects of the state of nature while ensuring that the government is limited to
those powers assigned to it.  By focusing on the nature of the function per-
formed, rather than on the exclusive and traditional history of the function,
the non-delegable governmental function exception identifies those func-
tions that must be subject to constitutional constraint because of their special
risks of abuse.
B. The Use of Deadly Force Is a Non-Delegable Government Function
When a state allows private persons to use deadly force to seize
nondangerous criminal suspects, the private persons must be treated as state
actors because the state delegates judicial and executive functions that,
under social contract theory, cannot be entrusted to self-interested private
actors.  Delegation of this power to private actors also circumvents many of
the Constitution’s procedural and structural protections against an abuse of
214 See supra Part II.
215 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (2d ed. 1986)
(“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (“A demo-
cratic society does not . . . need constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect
‘current values.’  Elections take care of that quite well.”).
216 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (plurality opinion) (“For a state to
permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those
processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.”).
217 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627–28 (1991) (jury selection).
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judicial and executive power, the maintenance of which is fundamental to
the preservation of our constitutionally limited government.
Allowing private actors to use deadly force, where the government is pro-
hibited from using such force itself, revives two of the three defects in the
state of nature that necessitated the formation of government.  The state of
nature lacked a “known and indifferent judge” with authority to resolve dis-
putes according to established law, and it lacked the executive power to
enforce a just sentence.218  As Locke explained, self-interested individuals
are incapable of exercising the objectivity, restraint, and discretion required
by the judiciary and the executive:
For every one in that state, being both judge and executioner of the law of
nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to
carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as
negligence and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other
men’s.219
The private actor’s bias and self-interest may lead the actor to use deadly
force where an objective observer would exercise restraint.  The private actor
simply cannot exercise the same objectivity as trained police officers, and the
actor is certain to make mistakes in judgment as to the suspect’s guilt and the
necessity of using deadly force to accomplish the arrest.220  Even if the sus-
pect is guilty, the victim may use deadly force in the heat of the moment
when he otherwise would have exercised restraint given time for reflection
and calm deliberation.  Whether the suspect lives or dies is entirely depen-
dent upon the unpredictable temperament and predilections of a single per-
son.  Certainly, race, gender, and religious beliefs—which cannot be
considered by the state in issuing punishment—will often play a part in the
private actor’s decision to use deadly force.221  People consent to govern-
ment power to avoid this “irregular and uncertain” use of force by self-inter-
ested private actors.222  James Madison echoed this view in The Federalist No.
10, when he said, “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,
218 LOCKE, supra note 200, §§ 125–26.
219 Id. § 125.
220 Under the common law, the use of deadly force is privileged only to the arrest of a
felon in fact, although the use of force need only appear necessary rather than be actually
necessary.  Day, supra note 9, at 288–91. R
221 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE (1988) (discussing the impact of
race on the Bernhard Goetz shooting of four African-American men on the New York
subway and his successful assertion of self-defense); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 781
(1994) (discussing the effects of racial stereotypes on the reasonable person standard of
self-defense); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 438–52 (1996).
222 LOCKE, supra note 200, § 127.
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because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.”223
The private actor’s use of deadly force also disrupts the Constitution’s
separation of power by consolidating the judicial and the executive functions
in the hands of private actors.  The private actor serves as constable, prosecu-
tor, jury, and judge.  She gathers the evidence, pronounces guilt, and issues a
punishment all in a split-second decision.  The basic functions of the judici-
ary and the executive cannot be combined and delegated to private actors
unless those private actors are also subject to constitutional constraint.
Moreover, a private actor’s use of deadly force deprives the suspect and
society of all of the Constitution’s procedural protections inherent in the
judicial process and critical to a free society.  The right to counsel, confronta-
tion, trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are all rendered
immaterial by the state’s delegation of power to the private actor.  Even
assuming the private actor could establish that the suspect was guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the Constitution simply does not permit the death pen-
alty for nonviolent crime.  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for
even serious and violent crimes such as burglary,224 robbery,225 and rape.226
Even for murder, the death penalty is constitutional only after careful consid-
eration of mitigating and aggravating factors.227  The protections of our basic
charter would be rendered meaningless by delegating the power to deter-
mine guilt and punishment to private citizens enraged by a threat to their
property.
Indeed, many consider the defining characteristic of the modern state to
be its monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force.228  The sovereign
monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force is recognized by the courts
and is the basis for several familiar legal principles.229  German philosopher
223 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 196, at 79 (James Madison); see also Pilla v. Am.
Bar Ass’n, 542 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1976) (“It is axiomatic that no man should sit in
judgment of his own case.”).
224 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982)).
225 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800–01.
226 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420–21 (rape of a child).
227 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537–38 (2003) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes an obligation on counsel to
uncover and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase).
228 See 2 ANTHONY GIDDENS, A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
121 (1987); 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 56 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968); MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (Talcott Par-
sons, ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1947) [hereinafter
WEBER, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC].
229 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359–61 (1993).  The restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity provides that a state is immune from the jurisdiction of
foreign courts when it exercises “powers peculiar to sovereigns,” but not where it exercises
powers also possessed by private citizens. Id. at 360 (quoting Republic of Arg. v. Weltover,
Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).  The enforcement of penal law has been universally
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Max Weber—the most celebrated champion of the state’s monopoly on the
use of coercive force—recognized that the state may delegate that use of
force to others.230  Of course, in our constitutionally constrained govern-
ment, the government can logically delegate only the power that it actually
possesses.  If the government is constitutionally prohibited from using deadly
force to seize fleeing felons, it cannot delegate that power to private citizens
free from similar constitutional constraint.
If the Constitution does not apply to this delegation of governmental
power, the government may achieve an end—through private proxy—that it
is constitutionally prohibited from achieving directly.  The state cannot
impose the death penalty for the crime of theft, and it cannot use deadly
force to prevent the escape of non-violent criminals.231  Under the current
traditional and exclusive government performance test, however, the state
may privilege private actors to use deadly force to stop non-violent criminals
and achieve this unconstitutional end through private proxy.  The non-dele-
gable governmental function test prevents the delegation of unconstitutional
force because it involves a special risk of abuse that must be subject to consti-
tutional constraint.
C. Applying the Non-Delegable Government Function Test to Existing Precedent
The functional, non-delegable duty rationale provides a stronger expla-
nation, both descriptively and normatively, of many of the Supreme Court’s
state action cases than does the current traditional and exclusive perform-
ance test.  In some cases, the private actor is exercising a Lockean govern-
mental power and thwarting the Constitution’s structural or procedural
regarded as a classic example of a uniquely sovereign power from which the state is abso-
lutely immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. See id at 359–61; see also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91–93 (1972) (finding that seizure of property pursuant to a writ of
replevin initiated and obtained by self-interested private party, without any state official
review of the basis for the claim to repossession or the need for immediate seizure, consti-
tutes an unconstitutional abdication of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force
and violates the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2001) (“States and other public agencies do
not violate the antitrust laws by charging fees or taxes that exploit the monopoly of force
that is the definition of government.”); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 409
(W. Va. 1980) (“State imposed retribution has historically been the quid pro quo of the
State’s monopoly of force and its proscription of individual retribution.”).
230 See MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION 2 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans.,
Fortress Press 1965) (1946); WEBER, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC, supra note 228, at 156.
231 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985).  In Garner, the Court noted that at
common law, deadly force was permissible in the apprehension of a felon but was con-
demned as disproportionately severe when used to apprehend a misdemeanant. Id. at 12.
This may have been sensible when distinction between felonies and misdemeanors was
“‘broad and deep’” and felons were typically much more dangerous than perpetrators of
lesser crimes. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).  Today, however, the distinction between misde-
meanors and felonies often has very little to do with the danger posed by the crime. Id.
For example, the drunken driver—a misdemeanor offense—creates a far greater danger to
the public than does the white-collar criminal—a felony offense. Id. at 14 n.12.
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means of government control at the same time.  In each case, the non-dele-
gable duty test ensures that the government cannot use private proxies to
circumvent the carefully crafted constitutional limitations on government
power.
1. Jury Selection
The non-delegable governmental duty analysis better explains the Con-
stitution’s prohibition on the use of discriminatory peremptory challenges in
the jury selection process.  One of the defects of the state of nature was the
lack of disinterested judges to resolve legal disputes.  In the American judicial
system, juries provide a unique check on the exercise of government power
by resolving disputed questions of fact and applying the law to the facts.232
All citizens that qualify for jury service have a constitutional right to partici-
pate without regard to race or gender.233  Furthermore, the Equal Protection
Clause guarantees that the state will not exclude members of the defendant’s
race from the jury simply on account of race.234  If those selecting the jurors
are not constrained by the Constitution, then the adjudicators of disputes
may not be impartial.  When government prosecutors use peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race or gender, they violate the Equal
Protection Clause.235  Of course, prosecutors are the quintessential state
actor.
The Court, however, has also held that private civil litigants exercising
peremptory challenges are state actors when they exercise peremptory chal-
lenges and are therefore prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from
striking jurors on the basis of race or gender.236  Even criminal defense attor-
neys, the adversaries of the government’s prosecutorial power, are subject to
constitutional limitations when exercising peremptory challenges.  They may
not strike jurors on the bases of race or gender.237  Although much of the
Court’s rationale in the jury selection cases focuses upon the government
entanglement in the process, these cases may also be properly thought of as
non-delegable governmental function cases.  The government delegates to
private persons the power to select the members of a “quintessential govern-
mental body,” which is a “critical governmental function[ ].”238
232 The jury also serves as a check on the executive and legislative branches because
they possess the power, if not the express right, to nullify the law where its application
offends their collective sense of justice in the particular case, or they believe that the gov-
ernment has abused or exceeded its power. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The
Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33,
34–37 (2003) (discussing the constitutional role of jury nullification as a check on govern-
mental power).
233 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
234 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879).
235 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
236 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991).
237 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54–55 (1992).
238 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624.
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Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may be to protect a private
interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine represen-
tation on a governmental body.  Were it not for peremptory challenges,
there would be no question that the entire process of determining who will
serve on the jury constitutes state action. The fact that the government delegates
some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental char-
acter of the power exercised.239
If the government is constitutionally prohibited from discriminating on
the basis of race when selecting a jury, it cannot delegate that power to pri-
vate persons without similarly constraining the private actors.
The fact that the government may not desire the private person to use
the peremptory strike in a discriminatory manner, or that the private actor is
not seeking to further a state objective, is not determinative, although the
danger of delegation is certainly magnified when the government desires an
unconstitutional end and permits like-minded private persons, free from
constitutional constraint, to do the government’s “dirty work.”  Under such
circumstances, the danger of tyranny is particularly acute; private parties
achieve the government’s desired but unconstitutional result.  This is pre-
cisely what occurred in a series of cases out of Texas known as the “white
primary cases.”
2. The Right to Vote
In our democracy, the right to vote is perhaps the single most important
safeguard against the government’s abuse of power.  It is the act that consum-
mates the social contract by selecting our lawmakers, executives, and, directly
or indirectly, the judges that perform the basic functions of government.  It
confers legitimacy on the law and the power exercised to enforce it.  It is the
right that is “preservative of all rights,”240 and the Constitution requires that
“any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.”241  The government cannot circumvent this
basic structural protection against tyranny by passively allowing private par-
ties to interfere with, or deny others, the right to vote.
In the “white primary cases,” nominally private political parties prohib-
ited African-American voters from participating in party primary elections in
Texas.  In the first case, Nixon v. Herndon, Nixon, an African-American physi-
cian, challenged the constitutionality of a Texas statute that expressly prohib-
ited African-Americans from voting in the Democratic Party primaries.242
African-Americans were able to vote in the general elections, but at that time,
the Democratic Party candidate selected in the party primary was almost cer-
tain to win the general election. Therefore, excluding African-Americans
from voting in the primary effectively disenfranchised them.  The Supreme
239 Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
240 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
241 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)).
242 273 U.S. 536, 539–40 (1927).
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Court had no difficulty finding that the discriminatory statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.243
In response, the Texas legislature repealed the law and enacted a new
statute that delegated the task of specifying the qualifications of Democratic
Party members to the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party.244
To no one’s surprise, this private group chose to exclude African-Americans
from membership in the party, thereby denying them the right to vote in the
primary.245  A determined Nixon brought a second suit, Nixon v. Condon, and
alleged that the Executive Committee’s decision violated rights secured to
him by the Constitution.246  This presented a more difficult state action ques-
tion because the decision to discriminate was made by the Executive Commit-
tee rather than the Texas legislature.  The defendant maintained that the
exclusion of African-Americans from the primary was not attributable to the
state because the effect of the statute was merely to restore to the private
political parties the inherent power of voluntary associations to determine
their membership.247
Rather than confront the more difficult question of whether political
parties may determine membership without constitutional constraint, the
Court found direct state action in the statutory scheme that empowered the
Executive Committee to determine membership.  The Committee acted
under authority conferred by law, which made the discriminatory policy
binding upon the judges of election.248  But the language of the opinion
suggested that the rationale for applying the “great restraints of the Constitu-
tion” was the function performed, not merely the statutory delegation.
They [the Executive Committee] are not acting in matters of merely private
concern like the directors or agents of business corporations.  They are act-
ing in matters of high public interest, matters intimately connected with the
capacity of government to exercise its functions unbrokenly and smoothly.
Whether in given circumstances parties or their committees are agencies of
government within the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment is a ques-
tion which this court will determine for itself.249
Despite this promising rationale, just three years later in Grovey v. Town-
send, a unanimous Court held that an identical policy of racial exclusion
adopted by the representatives of the Democratic Party, who were assembled
in their convention rather than as a statutorily empowered Executive Com-
mittee, did not constitute state action subject to constitutional constraint.250
Thus, African-Americans were again denied participation in the Democratic
Party primaries—the only vote that was of significance in Texas at that time.
243 Id. at 541.
244 See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81–82 (1932) (discussing this development).
245 See id. at 82 (elaborating on this act).
246 Id. at 81.
247 Id. at 83.
248 Id. at 85.
249 Id. at 88–89.
250 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935).
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Nine years later, in Smith v. Allwright, the Court overruled Townsend.251
While the critical facts had not changed, the Court had, in the interim, rec-
ognized that the party primaries were an integral part of the “machinery for
choosing” state and national officials in the general election.252  The deter-
minative issue was not whether the Democratic Party was a private voluntary
association, but whether Texas had permitted private organizations to con-
trol critical aspects of the election process.  The Constitution grants all citi-
zens the right to vote without regard to race.253  States cannot directly deny
this right, as Texas did in Nixon v. Herndon, and they cannot delegate the
dirty work to private parties free from constitutional constraint.254  The right
to vote is a vital constitutional check on government power.  States are consti-
tutionally responsible for conducting elections, regardless of the nominally
private character of the persons to whom the state delegates the function.
“Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly
denied.”255
Finally, in Terry v. Adams, the Jaybird Democratic Association held its
elections prior to the official county elections but limited the elections to
“white” voters on the county official list.256  The successful Jaybird candidate,
selected by the Anglo-only vote, would then run, often unopposed, in the
official Democratic Party primary, which was open to all voters regardless of
race.257  Of course, the only vote that had any value was the Jaybird primary;
the Democratic primary was of little consequence because the candidate
selected by the Jaybirds was almost always elected.258  There was, however, a
critical difference between the election of a Jaybird candidate and the Demo-
cratic primary in Smith v. Allwright.  In Smith v. Allwright, Texas law controlled
much of the Democratic Party primary process.  In Terry, the Jaybirds avoided
state regulation of their elections by conducting them before the official pri-
mary.259  State law did not control any aspect of their primary, and the
Jaybird candidate did not enjoy inclusion as a separate party on the official
general election ballot.260  The Jaybird candidate, however, did appear on
the Democratic primary ballot, often unopposed, and inevitably became the
nominee.261  As a result, the Jaybird candidate appeared on the general elec-
tion ballot as the Democratic Party candidate.  In this case, the Court was
squarely presented with a case of state inaction—failure to regulate this once-
removed step in the election process—rather than state action.
251 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
252 Id. at 664.
253 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
254 Smith, 321 U.S. at 664.
255 Id.
256 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953) (plurality opinion).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 464.
260 Id. at 465 n.1.
261 Id. at 463.
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Despite the state’s lack of affirmative action, the Court found this dis-
tinction was a matter of form and not substance; the Constitution prohibits
the state from achieving the unconstitutional result it desired—racial dis-
crimination in elections.262  The state had used its power to regulate the pri-
mary process.  Rather than regulate or prohibit the Jaybirds’s candidate
selection process, the state left open a path for like-minded private persons to
achieve the constitutionally prohibited end.  Although the state was passive,
the Court held the state responsible and concluded that a state violates the
Fifteenth Amendment when it allows “the use of any device that produces an
equivalent of the prohibited [discriminatory] election.”263  In short, ensuring
the constitutionality of the election process is a governmental function even
when the state allows private entities to perform the functional equivalent of
the election process.  The constitutional restrictions apply to the private
political party primaries not because of government entanglement with the
primaries, but because of the importance of the right to vote as a means of
controlling the government and protecting individual rights.  If the govern-
ment cannot deny citizens the vote on the basis of race, it cannot passively
allow private parties to achieve the same constitutionally prohibited result.
This is particularly true where, as here, the state government and the private
actors apparently desired the same unconstitutional end.
3. Legislative Function, Property Ownership
The non-delegable governmental function exception also accounts for
what many consider to be the Court’s most controversial state action deci-
sion—Shelley v. Kraemer.264  In Shelley, the Supreme Court of Missouri
enforced a private restrictive covenant that prohibited the sale of a single-
family home to African-Americans.265  Private parties negotiated the racially
restrictive covenant, and the state did not have an active role in the initial
discrimination.266  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the state’s
later use of judicial powers to enforce the covenant and enjoin a willing
homeowner from selling his home to a willing buyer constituted state action,
thus violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.267  As the
Court explained:
These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely
abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such dis-
criminations as they see fit.  Rather, these are cases in which the States have
made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to
262 Id. at 465 n.1, 469–70.
263 Id. at 469.
264 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  The Court actually considered two cases. Id. at 7.  The second
case involved a substantially similar racially restrictive covenant enforced by the Supreme
Court of Michigan. See Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947) (addressing the Michigan
case).
265 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 6 (citing Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946)).
266 Id. at 11.
267 Id. at 20.
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deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of prop-
erty rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to
acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell. . . . Nor is the Amendment
ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the
State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement.
State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.268
The criticism of Shelley is that its rationale leads to the conclusion that all
judicial resolutions of private disputes result in state action.269  For example,
if a private homeowner utilizes state trespass laws to exclude another private
person from his property based on race, a civil lawsuit for trespass or a state
prosecution for trespass becomes an unconstitutional state action.  However,
such private use of neutral trespass laws does not constitute state action.270
As the Court held in Washington v. Davis, as long as the law is facially neutral,
the discriminatory impact from enforcement of the law does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.271  In other words, a racially discriminatory purpose
must be traced back to a government actor as opposed to the private actors
simply seeking enforcement of a facially neutral law.272
However, when Shelley is thought of as a non-delegable governmental
function case, it is easy to distinguish it from the private use of trespass law.
The restrictive covenant in Shelley prevented the sale of property from a will-
ing seller to a willing purchaser.  The use of the restrictive covenants con-
trolled the conduct of third parties—in this case the willing seller and
purchaser—and effectively prohibited the sale of private property to racial
minorities in the same manner as racial zoning by state or local govern-
ments.273  The regulatory effect of the restrictive covenant on the conduct of
a willing seller and buyer converted the private action into government regu-
lation.  The danger of delegation is particularly great in racially restrictive
covenants because, like the white primary cases, state actors had previously
sought to prohibit private sales of real estate to minorities through racial
zoning.274  Without the exception to the state action requirement, the state
268 Id. at 19–20.
269 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988); Mark D.
Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451,
484–91 (2007) (criticizing the constitutional rationale in Shelley and suggesting that the
Court could have reached the same decision through the application of federal statutes).
270 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.3 (8th ed.
2010) (discussing state encouragement or commandment of private actions); TRIBE, supra
note 269, at 1702 (elaborating on Shelley v. Kraemer); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
253–54 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that the home is a private area not
subject to public use without just compensation).
271 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
272 Id.
273 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18–21 (stating that the state provided coercive power to
individuals).
274 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81–82 (1917) (striking down a city ordinance that
prohibited African-Americans from occupying houses in predominately white
neighborhoods).
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could unconstitutionally discriminate by delegating the state’s regulatory
power to like-minded private citizens who are free to discriminate without
constitutional constraint.275
4. The Company Town
The non-delegable governmental function test nicely explains the
Court’s decision in Marsh v. Alabama,276 perhaps the most famous state
action case.  In Marsh, the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned and con-
trolled the town of Chickasaw, Alabama, located not far outside of Mobile.277
Although it was a company town, Chickasaw was indistinguishable from other
small towns and included a business district with company-owned roads and
sidewalks.278  A Jehovah’s Witness was arrested and convicted of trespassing
after refusing the company’s demand that she stop distributing religious liter-
ature on Chickasaw’s sidewalks.279  Had Chickasaw been a municipal corpo-
ration rather than a company town, the conviction undoubtedly would have
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ protections of freedom of
speech and religion.280  However, because the town was privately owned, the
state court held that the company could control the conduct of its guests to
the same extent as any homeowner.281
The Supreme Court reversed the trespass conviction, holding that the
First Amendment’s protections applied to those in the company town just as
it would to any municipal corporation.282  The Court clearly explained that
the result would have been the same whether the company operated the
town under an express state franchise or the state merely acquiesced to the
private use of the property as a town.283  The distinction between the private
homeowner and the company town was the broad impact of the town’s power
on free expression.  While a homeowner’s private infringement of liberty
leaves plenty of room for the free flow of information, the company town
wields the tyrannical law-making power of the government.  In this instance,
the company’s use of the state trespass law amounted to a delegation of law-
making power.  Although the defendant in Marsh was convicted of trespass-
ing in violation of Alabama law, she was deemed a trespasser only because the
275 In this respect it is very similar to Terry v. Adams.  Texas was constitutionally prohib-
ited from denying participation in primaries based upon race, but Texas permitted,
through inaction, the duplication of the discriminatory process.  345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953)
(plurality opinion).  Similarly, Missouri was constitutionally prohibited from imposing
racial segregation in housing, but permitting and enforcing racially restrictive covenants,
while prohibiting most private restraints on alienability, allowed private citizens to achieve
the result the state was prohibited from achieving directly. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 18–21.
276 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
277 Id. at 502.
278 Id. at 502–03.
279 Id. at 503.
280 Id. at 503–04.
281 Id. at 505–06.
282 Id. at 509.
283 Id. at 507.
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company had created the equivalent of its own city code that prohibited the
distribution of religious literature.  If the state could delegate the task of run-
ning city governments to private persons, the Constitution’s limitations on
the exercise of government power could be thwarted under the guise of pri-
vate action.
It is tempting to think of Marsh as an entanglement case because the
state actively participated in the violation of First Amendment liberties.
Although the arresting officer was employed by the company, the officer was
also a deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff’s Office—a state actor.284  Moreo-
ver, the defendant in Marsh was prosecuted in a state court by a government
prosecutor for violating the state’s trespassing law.285  It is clear, however,
that the mere enforcement of a state trespass law against a person who ref-
uses to leave a private residence when commanded by the homeowner does
not convert the homeowner into a state actor.286
The critical difference in Marsh is that the company town exercised the
equivalent law-making power of a municipal government.  Legislative power
was given to the government as part of social contract.  This power cannot be
delegated to those not constitutionally constrained any more than the execu-
tive or judicial power may be delegated to private actors without also impos-
ing constitutional constraint on the private actors.  Certainly, if Alabama
allowed company-employed prosecutors and judges to prosecute trespassers
in a private Chickasaw City Court owned and operated by the Gulf Shipbuild-
ing Corporation, and then sentenced to imprisonment in a company-owned
jail, the Court would find that the company employees were state actors.  The
legislative, executive, and judicial functions are non-delegable governmental
duties subject to the Constitution’s protection of individual rights, equal pro-
tection of the law, and due process, even when the government permits these
tasks to be performed by private actors.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution seeks to strike a balance between providing a govern-
ment capable of constraining the people to avoid the lawlessness of the state
of nature and constraining the government to prevent tyrannical power.
This Article’s proposed non-delegable governmental duty model, based upon
the social contract theory, ensures that the state cannot “delegate” to private
persons a “power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited
from exercising.”287  Under this functional approach, where the state dele-
284 Id. at 502.
285 Id. at 503–04.
286 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 270, § 12.3 (discussing state encouragement or
commandment of private activities); TRIBE, supra note 269, at 1702 (elaborating on private
individuals’ actions); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 253–60 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (explaining that African-American defendants’ convictions should have been
overturned because the restaurant that refused to serve them was a state actor).
287 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (explaining
that if the state cannot prohibit a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy, it cannot
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gates executive, legislative, or judicial functions to private actors, they are
subject to the same constitutional restrictions that apply to state actors.288
Not only does this prevent a partial return to the anarchy of the state of
nature, but it also prevents the state from selectively delegating governmental
functions to private actors in order to circumvent the constitutional con-
straints placed upon the government’s direct use of power.
This reformulation of the public function exception does not prohibit
the government from delegating some legislative, executive, and judicial
functions, or from enlisting the aid of private persons in the performance of
these functions.  Although non-delegation would eliminate the need for a
public function exception, it would needlessly deprive the government of
flexibility.  In some cases, exigent circumstances may necessitate that the gov-
ernment enlist the aid of the public in performing these and other govern-
mental functions rather than performing them exclusively through formal
state actors.  In other cases, it may be more efficient to delegate the task to
private actors.289
When private persons participate in these core governmental functions,
however, the constitutional restrictions on governmental power must apply
to private actors as well as the government.  Without this exception, the two
tyrannies the Constitution sought to prevent—the bias and self-interest of the
state of nature and the tyranny of unlimited governmental power—coalesce
in the hands of a private actor.  If the government is constitutionally prohib-
ited from acting, it cannot delegate the same task to a private person who is
free to do the government’s dirty work.  A police officer’s use of deadly force
to seize non-dangerous criminals is unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment; therefore, the state cannot “permit a duplication” of this unconstitu-
tional practice by permitting private persons to flagrantly abuse the Fourth
Amendment.  Seizure by means of deadly force deprives the suspect of his
life—the most fundamental of the protected individual interests.290  As the
Court reasoned in Garner, “It is not better that all felony suspects die than
that they escape.”291  Tyranny by private proxy is no more tolerable than
direct governmental tyranny.
“delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited
from exercising” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp.
1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (Webster, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
288 Similarly, under tort law minors are held to an adult standard of care, rather than
that of a child of similar age, intelligence, and experience when performing activities that
are generally appropriate only for adults because of the judgment required and the dan-
gers involved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A cmt. c (1965).
289 See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
290 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (discussing seizure by deadly force).
291 Id. at 11.
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